Through an innovative trade-in-task case study, we explore how Nokia, which is historically one of the most important mobile phone manufacturers in the world, offshored the development and production of three distinct mobile phones at three different points in time. Adjacent to these processes, we find that the value creation in areas such as design and manufacturing knowledge has rapidly shifted away from advanced economies to emerging economies. Moreover, we find that the value added captured by Nokia decreased dramatically over the studied time period. Based on our results, we uss more generally the challenge of multinational corporations to preserve value and how the realisation of the benefits of offshoring must be assessed with respect to the altered requirements for controlling value-adding activities.
Introduction
As firms relocate business tasks and activities across geographical and organisational boundaries (i.e. engage in offshoring (Massini, Pern-Ajchariyawong, and Lewin 2010) ), a key challenge relates to the act of balancing the value provided by accessing locational advantages and the costs of disintegrating and dispersing organisational activities (Baldwin and Venables 2013; Asmussen, Larsen, and Pedersen 2016) . On the one hand, firms can create value through offshoring by relocating disaggregated activities to locations with favorable factor endowments, including access to low-cost labour and new knowledge (Farrell 2005; Lewin, Massini, and Peeters 2009) . On the other hand, recent research has focused on the costs of offshoring and the global distribution of work. For example, Aron and Singh (2005, 135) argue that firms are often caught up by the harsh realities of offshoring. They fail to adopt the correct processes and calculate the operational and structural risks to live up to their initial expectations of offshoring activities (Larsen, Manning, and Pedersen 2013) .
Recent research has focused on these value-creating tensions spurred by offshoring. For example, studies have found that the distribution of value creation across global supply chains in a variety of industries is increasingly skewed (e.g. Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2009; Ali-Yrkkö 2010; Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden 2010) . In a case study on the global value chain of the iPod, a product that has been largely offshored to China and assembled from several hundred components and parts that are sourced from around the world, Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2010) find that Apple captures only approximately one-third of the retail price, whereas companies such as Toshiba from Japan and Samsung from South Korea capture another major part as profit from the manufacture of high-value components such as the hard-disk drive, display and memory. Other studies show that recipient emerging economy firms are increasingly 'catching up' with lead firms in terms of value creation as a result of the spillovers created by offshoring (Mudambi 2008) .
Our study seeks to contribute to this stream of research by exploring a firm's ability to create value in the face of extensive offshoring. Value creation can be seen as the ability to appropriate rents of resources owned by the firm (Peteraf 1993 ) and has been emphasised as a major source of competitive advantage (Barney 1991) . In this respect, we stress that the process of offshoring encapsulates the important decisions of the location of firm activities (i.e. where; Dunning 1998) and the organisation (i.e. by whom; cf. Buckley and Casson 1976 ) that both may affect firms' ability to create value. First, reliance on external suppliers may, for reasons such as coordination and exchange hazards, jeopardise the target firm's ability to fully control its value-creating activities (Williamson 1975) . Second, operations in foreign locations may subject firms to 'liabilities of foreignness' (Zaheer 1995) , wherein unfamiliar business practices and uncertain institutions potentially undermine the firm's ability to control its value-adding activities (Gatignon and Anderson 1988) . However, in contrast to research focusing on the performance consequences of these offshoring decisions (e.g. Massini, Pern-Ajchariyawong, and Lewin 2010) or studies that focus on single points in time Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden 2010) , we explore how these effects unfold over time (see Mudambi 2008 , for a similar approach). Therefore, the research question that guides our study is the following: How do the organisation and geography of firms' value creation change as firms engage in offshoring?
We explore this question through an exploratory trade-in-task 1 case study of the geographical and organizational value creation of three comparable mobile phones that were developed and introduced at different points in time by Nokia, which is historically one of the most important mobile phone manufacturers in the world. Specifically, by using 'teardown' reports of the phones' component compositions and other financial data, we study the value creation of the specific type of actual tasks at the product level at three different points in time (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008) .
Our analyses reveal a number of interesting insights into the relationship between offshoring and value creation in the face of economic globalisation in the mobile phone industry. First, we find strong evidence of the forces that encourage geographic dispersion, which has clearly prevailed over the time period in our case study. Over the course of the three products, we can clearly document a rapid shift from value being created in the home country to value predominantly being created abroad in the emerging economies. We find 1 specialisation or division of labour is becoming an important source of economic growth for any national economy. tradein-task method represents a way to understand the deepening specialisation in division of labour. It also provides the tools to understand the expansion of the market and its productivity growth across national economies (Lanz, Miroudot, and nordås 2011) .
that tasks such as technology and product development, prototyping, component manufacturing and final assembly are increasingly conducted in emerging economies, particularly China. Specifically, the value added that is created in Asia (China) increased from 55% in 2003 to 66% in 2007, whereas the value added created in the home country (Finland) decreased from 24 to 11% over the same period. At the same time, we find that the value added captured by Nokia dropped dramatically over the studied time period. Nokia's value added share decreased from 38% in 2003 to 19% in 2007, whereas the value added captured by the vendor of vendors increased from 22 to 34%. Further, our results imply that the shift in value creation includes tangibles and manufacturing in addition to intangibles and design knowledge. Although the management of most valuable intangibles, such as patents and similar intellectual property, continued to be located in advanced economies, market knowledge was increasingly relocated to the emerging economies. For example, whereas Nokia's Beijing R&D site had previously focused on products for the Chinese market, the Beijing site increasingly designed products for the global market.
More generally, our case study reveals a process of excessive value redistribution across national and organisational boundaries, which has important theoretical contributions to research on a multinational corporation's (MNC's) ability to control its value creation activities and competency upgrading in global value chains. Although we can only speculate on the reasons for the value redistribution, including the challenges of managing offshoring, increasing competition, commoditisation and deteriorating bargaining power, we discuss how they pose new requirements for contemporary MNCs that are managing global production networks. In particular, whereas the extant research has focused on offshoring consequences such as 'unbundling costs' (Baldwin and Venables 2013) , reconfiguration costs (Larsen 2016) and disrupted learning capabilities (Reitzig and Wagner 2010) , we emphasise how the processes of relying more on foreign locations and external suppliers place the MNC in a more vulnerable position as its ability to create and retain value is challenged. Consequently, as value creation is increasingly subsumed at the level of geographically distant subsidiaries (internal and external), offshoring firms need, to a larger extent, to assume the responsibility of systems integrators to lead and coordinate geographically dispersed networks of value-creating units (cf. Brusoni, Prencipe, and Pavitt 2001) . Finally, we demonstrate how bottom-up, product-level research on tangible products may reveal several important insights into how firms actually offshore relocate firm activities and the consequences of this action. Although there are a few other examples of this methodology (e.g. Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2009; Ali-Yrkkö et al. 2011; Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden 2011; Seppälä, Kenney, and Ali-Yrkkö 2014) , we contribute by exploring the changes in the organisation over the course of introducing three distinct mobile phones.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, data sources and methods used to explore the relationship between offshoring and value creation. Section 3 provides the empirical analysis and the results, and Section 4 discusses the implications of this study and provides suggestions for further research.
Data and methods

Empirical context
To explore how the organisation and geography of firms' value creation change as firms engage in offshoring, we use an innovative trade-in-task case study of Nokia. The company was founded in 1865 by Fredrik Idestam, a mining engineer, as a ground wood pulp mill to manufacture paper in the town of Nokia in Finland. In the early 1990s, the mobile telecommunications market began to grow rapidly. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Nokia emerged as one of the world's largest manufacturers of mobile devices and networks. The Finnish telecommunications cluster was by far the fastest-growing industrial sector, and Nokia was the fastest-growing major company in Finland.
At the peak of Nokia's success in the mid-2000s, the company produced more than 400 million mobile devices, had net sales of more than €40 billion and an operating profit of €2 billion, and represented an estimated 31% of the global market share. Furthermore, the firm accounted for 1% of total employment and 4% of the Finnish GDP. The company was responsible for more than 40% of corporate R&D in Finland. Before being acquired by Microsoft in 2013 after a long period of declining sales, Nokia had a global workforce of 130,000 employees in 120 countries worldwide.
Given our single focus on Nokia, this research can be characterised as an exploratory case study (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003) , which is appropriate for studying firm processes in depth and is especially suitable for complex processes such as knowledge transfer and innovation across country borders (Birkinshaw, Brannen, and Tung 2011) . Specifically, we follow similar product-level research (e.g. Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2009; Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden 2010) to explore where value is created over time in a single company. Moreover, as we study the value creation and location of tasks, a case study of a single company is more appropriate than, for example, a large-n survey. We analyse three candy-bar-form factor handset models with small monochrome displays and no cameras that were launched by Nokia: the 3310 (in 2000), the 1100 (in 2003) and the 1200 (in 2007). These three models are among the world's bestselling handset models, with the 3310 as the fifth bestselling mobile phone of all time, the 1100 the bestselling mobile phone of all time, and the 1200 the third bestselling mobile phone of all time. Each has sold more than 100 million units.
2 All three handset models had similar functionalities but different industrial designs; that is, the looks and mechanical designs of the handset models were different.
We maintain that these three mobile devices are a representative sample of a larger portfolio of products and can help explain what was occurring on a large scale within a mobile device supply chain. In particular, the 1100 and 1200 were basic models targeted at first-time users in entry markets and did not have any significant new features compared to older models, such as the 3310 and the 3210. Moreover, it is important to recognise that the added value from research and development for each mobile phone model was practically equal (i.e. Nokia 3300 -2,2% of total added value; Nokia 1200 -2,7% of total added value; and Nokia 1100 -2,9% of total added value).
3 Furthermore, Nokia was capable of keeping the model-level programme cost relatively stable over the lifecycle of these models, at an estimated level of ten million Euros. Accordingly, the similarity among the handset models offers the opportunity to consider the commoditisation of technology, task-level knowledge transfer and globalisation, and geographical and organisational value creation at the product level. An ideal setting for a dynamic examination of product-level value creation allows us to analyse the same product over multiple years. However, in the mobile phone industry, the life cycle of single products is too short for this approach. Therefore, we used several comparable models (see the methods chapter below).
Data description
Typically, companies will not provide information about the pricing of components or manufacturing costs. The same is true for distributors and retailers. For this reason, we used four different information sources to estimate the distribution of the value added that was created by different participants and regions.
First, in October 2010, we physically disassembled the Nokia 3310, 1100 and 1200 phones and, in collaboration with electrical engineers, examined each of their hundreds of components. Second, we used 'teardown' reports of the component compositions that are published by industry analysts. These reports (see, e.g. Portelligent 2007 ) include estimates of factory prices and vendors. Third, using the knowledge gathered in the previous steps, we collected further qualitative and quantitative information by interviewing 12 industry experts who were either currently working or had previously worked in various roles in the mobile handset supply chain. The interviews were conducted between April 2009 and May 2011. 4 The data, especially the component and production cost data, that were collected as part of the first and second steps of the research process were augmented and adjusted to more correct levels by these interviews. Finally, we examined the financial reports, including financial statements and balance sheets, and press releases of the companies involved and those of their direct competitors. In particular, we exploited the differences in reporting in various geographical locations and examined officially required additional information, such as Securities and Exchange Commission 20-F reports in the US and the ORBIS database from Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (DvDEP).
Methods
To explore our research question, we conduct three sub-analyses. First, we explore the dynamics in the location of the tasks of the three different mobile phones. This analysis enables us to investigate the extent to which the forces that encourage geographic dispersion actually prevail. Second, we investigate the direct costs of manufacturing the three phone models and use this as a basis for analysing the value creation by different supply chain participants. This approach allows us to understand the dynamics of value creation across the three different models. Finally, we examine the location of the value creation using the same logic as the second analysis but focusing on the geographical dimension.
To facilitate these three analyses, we need to map the supply chain underlying the development and production of the three mobile phones. In this respect, we are interested in the global flows of intermediate goods and services, including those provided in-house 4 Because of the topic's sensitivity, we had to ensure full anonymity to our interviewees. the interviews were semi-structured, and the questions varied among interviewees depending on their positions in the supply chain and financials.
(captive) and those purchased from unaffiliated companies (outsourced), that are involved in providing a good or service for final consumption (Figure 1 ).
Generally speaking, the flow in Figure 1 is as follows. The outputs of miners/refiners are turned into sheets of metal and other elementary processed goods that are traded to parts and components vendors. The 3310, 1100 and 1200 consist of approximately 250-400 components, and their vendors deliver the great majority of these components to sub-assemblers (who may, in turn, deliver the same components to other sub-assemblers). In the final assembly, the assembly to order phase (ATO), Nokia itself combines these sub-assemblies and certain separate components. Some of the intangibles, to the extent that they are not embedded in and bundled with physical components, are licenced. Standalone software is purchased from third parties, as necessary. Furthermore, many of the intangibles are provided in-house or by vendors compensated at a billable hourly rate. Depending on the market, in the case of mobile phones, Nokia's immediate customers are typically distributors (e.g. Brightpoint Inc.) who, in turn, supply wholesalers and retailers or operators (e.g. Vodafone).
In each step, each organisation conducts its own value-creating activities (Y c ) and sells its output, c, to the other participants in the supply chain. The sum of all value-creating activities equals the final retail price (Y) before any applicable taxes (Equation 1):
For each company in the supply chain of the three phones, we calculate the value creation as the difference between the cost of the inputs purchased by an organisation and the price for which it sells the output. Accordingly, we apply a strict definition of value creation, focusing on either the monetary amount realized at a certain point in time, when the exchange of the new task, good, service, or product takes place, or the amount paid by the user to the seller for the use value of the focal task, job, product, or service. (Lepak, Smith, and Taylor 2007, 181) For the retailer, the wholesaler and Nokia, we were able to calculate accurate product-level value creation. For most of the other companies, i, in the supply chain, we derived the ratio definitions: a-cover is the front cover of the mobile phone; B-cover is the bottom cover of the mobile phone; d-cover is the middle cover of the mobile phone; Engine is the printed circuit board assembly; Engine's final assembly is the assembly of display, d-cover and printed circuit board assembly; assembly to order is the final assembly of a-cover, B-cover and an engine assembly, including software and sales packing. see Linden, Kraemer, and dedrick (2009) In addition to the value creation of each participant, we analysed its geographical breakdown. It should be noted that companies themselves do not typically provide product-level information regarding their locations for manufacturing and other operations. With further research from financial statements, balance sheets and interviews, we could nevertheless estimate this information fairly accurately, at least as far as broader regions are concerned.
The value capture of in-house indirect inputs, such as the role of general management, the corporate brand and image, and reusable tangible and intangible assets (including design and technical aspects copied from previous products or that contribute to future models), is difficult to allocate in general and is particularly difficult across geographical locations. Thus, we follow Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2011) and the estimation method developed therein (see Appendix 1). In the case of each participant, 10% of the value creation occurs at the headquarters location, and 90% is attributed according to the actual location(s) of participants' production factors (we also attempt to correct for regional productivity differences by using multi-factor productivity differences between regions (see Equation (A6) in Appendix 1)). The preferred method considers that there are many multinational companies that have production factors in different regions; that is, the value added of each component is distributed among geographical regions. Second, the method takes into account the location of the multinational companies' headquarters (i.e. the value-added contribution of management teams). Furthermore, the method considers that intellectual property rights are owned by company headquarters. Based on these two facts, the location management team and intellectual property, the preferred method allocates an extra share to the headquarters location.
Analysis
Location of tasks
Where does the production of three mobile models occur? To understand whether Nokia has increasingly offshored the development and production of the mobile phones, we need 5 For the companies that conform to us GaaP accounting principles, labour costs are unavailable. For these firms, we assume the value-added margin to be identical to that of its nearest competitor(s). For example, in the case of the charger included in the sales package of the nokia 1200, the factory price of the charger is approximately €0.8, and astec supplied a part of the chargers to this phone model. astec (us) (2)
to investigate the changes in the location of the tangible activities. Perhaps unsurprisingly, our data reveal that Nokia increasingly offshored the development and production of the mobile phones to Asia over the studied time period. During the 2000s, Nokia and its supplier network actively increased both their affiliated and unaffiliated operations in Asia. As part of this development, Nokia also offshored technology and other types of knowledge from Europe and the U.S. to China. Instead of being a sudden change, this process was gradual and occurred over almost a decade. Table 1 considers the transformation and locations of the following functions: (1) concept design and product management; (2) hardware and software platform design; (3) product-specific design tasks and prototyping; and (4) component, subassembly and product manufacturing. The information in Table 1 enables us to understand the evolution of the strategies of the firm and helps us comprehend the intra-and cross-functional dependencies between different tasks from a longitudinal transformation perspective.
The 3310 was one of Nokia's first global products. Although the prototype manufacturing was located in Finland, the mass manufacturing was distributed across three continents. Nonetheless, the model was mainly developed and managed in Europe. Tasks such as product programme management, hardware platform design, software platform design, concept (Seppälä 2010 (Seppälä , 2013a . Foxconn subsequently became the largest supplier of technology and electronics manufacturing services for Nokia. In the case of the 1100 and 1200, China had a substantially more important role as a location for parts of the production process. Although the main responsibility for hardware platform design, software design and industrial design remained in Denmark, Nokia's Beijing R&D site participated in development. Furthermore, the Chinese and Taiwanese part suppliers began to contribute to the parts' design. As part of this involvement, certain employees of Beijing's site visited Denmark to increase their knowledge about hardware platform design and product software design. During the 2000s, Nokia's Denmark R&D further increased its cooperation with the Taiwan-based Foxconn to include product test design and prototype manufacturing. Notably, although Nokia was able to significantly reduce its product development time with knowledge gained from Foxconn, the process of relocating activities to Foxconn and China did not come without substantial costs and challenges (Asmussen, Larsen, and Pedersen 2016) . Specifically, although Nokia had expected that Foxconn would be largely self-managed and require minimum intervention, the management recognised that substantial investments in coordination were required to safeguard against misinterpretations and misbehaviour. For example, after relocating the activities to China, the Nokia management realised the necessity of transferring substantially more technological information to China than originally expected. To achieve this, the management established frequent physical meetings, weekly video conferences to discuss the status of each project, and monitoring practices even for standardised activities to ensure that the products were developed according to plan. Moreover, eight full-time Nokia Denmark employees were assigned to follow and monitor the 30-50 engineers working in Foxconn in China. The partners also met in either Denmark or China every six to eight weeks.
China's role substantially increased to encompass tasks other than pure mass manufacturing. Whereas Nokia's Beijing R&D site had previously localised products to the Chinese market, the Beijing operation evolved to design products for the global market. In addition to technical knowledge transfer, this process included training programmes to encourage initiatives by local R&D employees. As such, Nokia began to relocate more technical responsibilities to China. Whereas the original intention had been to relocate more standardised activities to China while retaining the more knowledge-intensive activities closer to headquarters, the management realised that this was far too costly in terms of coordinating the interfaces between the geographically dispersed activities. Therefore, the management decided to also relocate parts of these activities to China. Accordingly, our data imply that Nokia has offshored larger responsibilities to China. This rise of China's role required the systematic development of resources and knowledge transfers. Consequently, in the spring of 2011, Nokia decided to downsize its Danish R&D site. Furthermore, Nokia's Finnish supplier network was replaced by Taiwanese and Chinese multinationals capable of providing lower unit and assembly costs (Seppälä 2010 (Seppälä , 2013a .
Who creates value?
Having established that Nokia increasingly offshored its tasks to Asia over the course of the three mobile phones, our next task is to investigate how this activity influenced the value creation of the mobile phones. We commence this investigation by analysing value creation by type of actor in the supply chain. In the next analysis, we consider value creation in terms of geography. We first consider the direct costs of components, parts, sub-assemblies, software and licences with respect to the three phone models (Table 2) . We begin by considering the actual sales prices (the gross value), and then we consider the first-tier suppliers on a value-added basis.
Based on our calculations, the direct bill-of-materials (BOM) was approximately €31.2, €23.7 and €14.6 for the 3310, 1100 and 1200 models, respectively. Thus, between 2003 and 2007, the BOM per phone was more than halved. One of the main drivers of price decline is technology commoditisation. As part of the process of technology commoditisation, knowledge essential for the production of components spread to developing countries. In addition to MNC's units in developing countries, local companies also became suppliers. For instance, the displays of the 3310 and 1100 came from Samsung (South Korea), whereas the displays for the 1200 were provided by Taiwanese vendors such as Wintek.
According to Seppälä (2013a Seppälä ( , 2013b , Nokia actively searched for and systematically developed local suppliers in developing countries at the end of the 1990s and during the 2000s. By lowering the unit cost of components and assembly internally and externally, the company was able to lower sales prices, which in turn enabled low-income customers to purchase handsets. This development indirectly served Nokia's strategy of increasing mobile phone penetration and its market share in developing countries. In addition to the five participant categories presented in Figure 1 , we separated the value creation by logistics and warranty operations. Because Nokia used both its in-house facilities and unaffiliated companies' facilities to manufacture mobile phone engines, we also separated engine manufacturing into its own category. 6 Table 3 shows the value creation breakdown of the three models' pre-tax retail prices. The pre-tax retail price for the Nokia 3310 was €79 in 2003, for the Nokia 1100 was €63 in 2004 and for the Nokia 1200 was €27 in 2007, which represents a total decrease of 66%.
For distributors, wholesalers and retailers, the value-added margin and the sales margin were effectively identical. In the case of the 3310, 1100 and 1200 models, retailers' margins ranged from 10.2 to 13.6% of the final sales price, 7 whereas the margins for the distributors/ 6 the sum of the bill of materials related to the engine's final assembly for the nokia 3310, the nokia 1100 and the nokia 1200 varies from 80% to 90% of the total bill of materials cost, depending on the phone model.
7
Mobile phone sales margins are difficult to estimate because of various types of tie-ins and bundlings with subscriptions and/or other services, in which case the initial transaction is often undertaken at a loss. We consider margins without any bundlings. However, retailers themselves decide how much to charge for the product or service; therefore, their sales margins vary. wholesalers were between 4 and 4.7%. These percentages also represent their share of the total product value. In all of these cases, Nokia generated a large share of the total value. However, Nokia's contribution to the value creation was substantially lower in the case of the 1200 than in the previous models. In value terms, the estimated value creation generated by Nokia for the 3310, 1100 and 1200 was €34, €26.7 and €5.7, respectively. This was partly because Nokia's BOM decline was unable to keep up with the drop in pre-tax sales price for this technology. These amounts were ascribed to direct and indirect in-house 8 labour costs, including final assembly (including the ATO phase), R&D, marketing, sales, sourcing, management, the depreciation of tangible and intangible assets, investments, and operating profit.
Careful study of industry sources and the information contained in our interviews suggests that the final assembly/manufacturing costs, including both engine assembly and the ATO, for the Nokia 3310, 1100 and 1200 were €7.4, €5.6 and €1, respectively. These amounts account for 3.7-9.4% of the pre-tax final sales prices. Thus, although final assembly is an essential part of the supply chain, the value creation (supplied by final assembly) declined and was surprisingly low.
With respect to the final assembly/manufacturing costs, first-tier hardware vendors were responsible for 17-19%, first-tier (external, non-cross-licensed) intangible vendors were responsible for 0.5-0.8%, and second-and higher-tier vendors (vendors-of-vendors) in both categories were responsible for 21-34% of this amount.
Where has the value been created?
In addition to understanding value creation by supply chain participants, we want to understand the location of value creation.
9 It should be noted that the geographical allocations of the country of final sales and final assembly are case specific. For instance, in the case of a Nokia 3310 that was assembled (engine and ATO assemblies) in Salo (Finland) for the UK market, an extra 9.4% of total value creation accrues to Finland and an extra 14.5% to the UK (Other EU area). In the case of an assembly in Beijing (China) for the US market, the accrual is different. In Table 4 , we consider five potential combinations (see Table 7 for details) and calculate the average of these results. 8 this includes some outsourced work that was purchased as billable hours. However, because of the lack of data, we were not able to allocate this to other companies. 9 these findings should not be confused with the results in Chapter 3.1, which discusses the location of the physical tasks and intangible knowledge (i.e. the direct evidence of offshoring). However, we obviously expect a strong correlation between the two analyses. Based on our estimates (Table 4) , the geography of value creation changed drastically during the 2000s. In the case of the 3310, overall, 33% of the value added was captured in Finland. When we consider the entire EU-27 area, the share was as high as 56%. These shares are quite different compared to those of the 1200, which was launched in 2007. In the case of the 1200, the corresponding shares for Finland and the entire EU area were 15 and 36%, respectively.
The data presented in Table 5 show the impact of structural changes caused by offshoring and sales locations. Although the Nokia 3310 was manufactured and sold in Finland, the Nokia 1200 was never manufactured or ever sold in Finland. Because of these differences among the models, the data presented in Table 3 must be used cautiously. To control for bias, we fixed the locations and considered the case in which both manufacturing and final sales were located in Asia (Table 5 ). In Table 6 , we considered all five potential combinations (see Table 7 for details) and calculated the averages of these results.
Although the exact data in Tables 4 and 5 differ, the overall trend is similar. The share of Asia increased, which correlates to an increased amount of value added. In Tables 6 and  7 , we consider the details of five alternatives in constructing the geographical breakdown, similar to Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2011) . Our baseline method, in Column A, allocates the value added to the headquarters location of each participant in the supply chain. This approach tends to overestimate the role of developed countries and regions. Our second method, in Column B (see Equation A4 in Appendix 1), assigns the value capture solely on the basis of the locations of the production factors (physical capital, labour and R&D). This implicitly assumes that the general management or corporate brand has no specific role in the value capture and tends to underestimate the role of developed countries and regions. The third alternative, in Column C, is an intermediate method between A and B in which it is assumed that in the case of each participant, 10% of the value capture occurs at the headquarters location and 90% occurs at the actual location(s) of the participant's factors of production. Individuals and organizations in various locations have different productivities. Thus, their abilities to create value may vary. Column D replicates Column B, but it attempts to correct for this fact by using multifactor productivity differences among regions (see Equation A6 in Appendix 1).
Our preferred estimation method (Column E) combines Columns C and D. Thus, in the case of each participant, 10% of the productivity-adjusted value creation occurs at the headquarters location, and 90% occurs at the actual location of the production factors. In Tables 6 and 7 , A and B constitute the lower and upper bounds for Europe, C and D refine certain aspects of the model, and E provides our preferred estimate of the geography of value creation. It should be noted that different models were manufactured and sold in various regions. For instance, the Nokia 3310 was manufactured and sold in Finland, but the Nokia 1200 was never manufactured or sold in Finland. Because both the location of assembly and the country of final sale have consequences for the geographical distribution of value creation, the above calculations reflect the arithmetic mean of the following four combinations (and are thus comparable across models/time): (1) assembled and sold in the EU, (2) assembled in Mexico and sold in the US, (3) assembled and sold in Asia and (4) assembled in Asia and sold in the EU. The majority of unaccounted inputs are low-cost inputs, such as resistors, capacitors and screws, which are mostly manufactured and designed in Asia. In the geographical breakdown, we assume that 80% of the total value added of these inputs is created in Asia, 10% in EU-27 countries and 10% in the United States. Based on our firm-level data, approximately one-third of this value is created in the new member states of the EU. Thus, we attribute this amount to the EU-27 and the remaining two-thirds to other countries (i.e. countries outside the EU-27, Asia and North America). We consider the vendors of material supplies and immaterial supplies separately. We divide the value creation that is created by vendors of material suppliers to all regions equally (EU-27, North America, Asia and other countries). In terms of the value created by immaterial suppliers' vendors, we assume that 90% of the value created by vendors of immaterial suppliers was created in these three regions and divide this 90% equally among the EU-27, North America and Asia. The remaining 10% is attributed to other countries.
Discussion and conclusion
Summary of findings
In this article, we have explored offshoring and the dynamics of value creation in the context of bottom-up, product-level research on three basic mobile phones introduced by Nokia between 1999 and 2007. We find that most of the tasks related to technology and product development, prototyping, component manufacturing and final assembly were offshored to emerging economies, particularly China, whereas the management of most valuable intangibles, such as patents and similar intellectual property, continues to be located in advanced economies. More interestingly, our results suggest that the value added by Nokia decreased drastically over the studied time period. For example, Nokia's value added share decreased from 38% in 2003 to 19% in 2007, whereas that of vendors increased from 22 to 34%.
Moreover, because the emerging economies execute most of the tasks related to technology and product development, prototyping, component manufacturing and final assembly, the share of value added attributable to the developing countries in which the value added was created increased. In the case of the Nokia 3310, which was launched in 1999, Asia captured an average of 28% of the total value, and the EU-27 captured an average of 56% of the total value. These shares changed dramatically with the Nokia 1200, which was launched in 2007. In the case of the 1200, Asia captured an average of 45% of the total value, and the EU-27 captured an average of 37% of the total value. Finally, the increase in the number of demanding tasks in developing countries required a transfer in competencies from developed countries. Instead of a sudden change, this process occurred gradually over several years. Previously, product creation units in developing countries only localised products; in 2007, some of these units, such as the Nokia Beijing product creation centre, were able to take full responsibility for developing products for global markets.
Implications for global distribution of value creation
At the outset of this article, we noted that the strategy of offshoring presents firms with a trade-off between accessing locational advantages, such as low-cost labour and talent, and co-location and agglomeration advantages that can be used to economise coordination and knowledge transfer costs (cf. Baldwin and Venables 2013; Asmussen, Larsen, and Pedersen 2016) . Our analysis adds nuance to this tension. The comparative locational advantages seem to create a strong incentive to unbundle and relocate firm activities to foreign sites. For example, Nokia relocated not only production activities to Asia but also intangible, more knowledge-intensive activities. One explanation may be that Nokia sought both locational advantages and agglomeration advantages by allocating the bulk of the development and production to Asia. However, our analyses also suggest that this transition did not come without additional complexities. Specifically, we demonstrate how the processes of offshoring may alter firms' ability to control and appropriate the value created at other locations and outside the firms' boundaries. In this respect, existing research has emphasised how the costs of disaggregating and relocating value adding activities, including 'unbundling costs' (Baldwin and Venables 2013) , disrupted learning capabilities (Reitzig and Wagner 2010) , and 'hidden costs' (Larsen, Manning, and Pedersen 2013) , may explain why firms often struggle to realise the full benefits of offshoring.
Building these insights, we propose that the changing distribution of value creation in Nokia's global production network paves the way for an enhanced understanding of the dynamics of offshoring and the global distribution of work (e.g. Dibbern, Winkler, and Heinzl 2008; Stringfellow, Teagarden, and Nie 2008; Larsen, Manning, and Pedersen 2013) . We argue that it does so with respect to an MNC's ability to control its value creation activities and competency upgrading in global value chains. First, in the tradition of the resource-based view, which considers value creation as being key to firm competitiveness (Barney 1991), a major task of the MNC is to control its value creation activities, especially as foreign locations and external partners become involved in the production network (Cantwell and Santangelo 1999) . However, our results suggest that the ability to preserve value creation is challenged as firms increasingly engage in offshoring and outsourcing. Although we can only speculate about the exact antecedents of this value redistribution (see discussion below), we maintain that it underscores the potential vulnerability of MNCs that rely extensively on foreign locations and external partners.
In this respect, Mudambi (2008, 699) argues that firms can protect their value-creating mandates by exploiting either 'linkage economies' (i.e. vertically integrating all geographically dispersed value-adding activities) or specialisation advantages (i.e. outsourcing peripheral activities to foreign third-party vendors). Relatedly, research on competency upgrading in global value chains has established that when subsidiaries upgrade their competencies, their role and area of responsibility potentially change (e.g. Cantwell 1995; Rugman and Verbeke 2001; Hobday and Rush 2007) . According to Cantwell and Mudambi (2005) , competence upgrading as part of subsidiary evolution is determined by several factors, including group-, subsidiary-and location-specific factors. However, the competence upgrading of vendors and subsidiaries should not be understood as an ultimate goal of any subsidiary or parent company. Pananond (2013) argues that subsidiaries upgrade their capabilities because they strive to move up the value chain. If subsidiaries do not have certain capabilities, they are not able to undertake such moves (see also Rasiah, Nolintha, and Songvilay 2011) . In general, when a subsidiary upgrades its competence, it is able to either better perform its current activities or extend its activities to new functions. Either result may lead to increased valued creation at the level of the host organisation, which is consistent with the definition of a foreign subsidiary as a value-adding entity, as noted by Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) . Importantly, our study provides an important insight into how the parallel forces of offshoring and competency upgrading in global value chains may challenge an MNC's ability to maintain its value-creating mandate. Whether as a result of the non-negligible costs of accessing local complimentary assets or internal and external subsidiaries with more power and capabilities, we emphasise that the realisation of the benefits of offshoring must be assessed with respect to the altered requirements for controlling value-adding activities. We summarise this discussion as follows:
Theoretical proposition: MNCs increasing global distribution of work challenges their ability to preserve value creation at home and within organizational boundaries.
On a methodological note, our study demonstrates how bottom-up, product-level research on tangible products may reveal several important insights into firms' global organisations. To our knowledge, only a few studies examine the effects of this movement towards trade-in tasks on value creation and its geographical distribution. For example, Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick (2009 , 2011 ) examined Apple's iPod to understand how value is distributed across supply chain participants and concluded that firms in the U.S. capture most of the value. Ali-Yrkkö (2010) and Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2011) analysed the geography of value creation in a Nokia N95 smartphone and found that even when the final assembly was located in China and the final sales occurred in the U.S., Finland captured 39% of the value created. We extend these previous studies in two important ways. First, instead of using a single point in time, our examination of three models introduced at different times enables a dynamic approach that allows us to analyse how the location of value creation has changed as the technology inside products has been commoditised. Second, we analyse which types of tasks have been offshored to emerging economies and which types have been retained in advanced economies. As a result, we are able to analyse the changes in value creation as a result of offshoring over time.
It is important to stress that value creation in offshoring should not be considered a 'zerosum game' in which value created abroad or with suppliers equates value lost at home or internally. Much research suggests how the process of offshoring can produce more value for the entire firm and not necessarily at the expense of other geographical and organisational units in the MNC network (Bertrand 2011; Nieto and Rodríguez 2011) . For example, Nieto and Rodríguez (2011) find that MNCs can enhance their general innovation performance by offshoring knowledge-intensive R&D tasks. Relatedly, Bertrand (2011) discusses how strategies of offshore outsourcing may assist firms to reduce production costs, enhance flexibility, access new resources and market knowledge and eventually increase export performance.
Equally, we recognise that there may be more than one explanation behind our results. Arguably, an important part of these changes relates to patterns such as increasing commoditisation, falling ICT prices, growing competition and decreasing bargaining power (Lepak, Smith, and Taylor 2007) . For example, extant research has long noticed the consequences of economic development in emerging economies for accumulating physical, human and social capital in tangible and intangible assets (see, e.g. Balassa 1979; Balassa and Noland 1989; Anderson 1990; Antras, Garricano, and Rossi-Hansberg 2005; Hausmann and Klinger 2006) . Similarly, because of the decreasing costs of unbundling and transportation, the necessity of making goods close to the point of consumption and the communication and coordination costs have decreased. Furthermore, as product processes mature and product architectures become increasingly modular, it becomes easier and less risky to unbundle different types of activities (see, e.g. Hobbs 1996; Ernst and Kim 2002; Antras, Garricano, and Rossi-Hansberg 2005; Baldwin 2006; Lorentz et al. 2012) . Over time, the overall production processes of mobile phone products gradually become more labour intensive, thus shifting the distribution of value added away from capital-intensive activities and towards labour-intensive tasks (see, e.g. Cantwell 1995; Jacobs et al. 1997; Mudambi and Navarra 2004; Antras, Garricano, and Rossi-Hansberg 2005; Cantwell and Mudambi 2005; Hobday and Rush 2007; Mudambi 2008) .
Concluding remarks
We propose that the processes of offshoring pose new requirements for firms (such as Nokia) that are managing global production networks. As distant subsidiaries (internal and external) presume a growing share of an MNC's value creation, we argue that the role of the MNC needs to change to preserve its value-creating mandates. In this respect, future research could examine the topic of systems integration, which can be defined as units that 'lead and coordinate from a technological and organizational viewpoint the work of suppliers involved in the network' (Brusoni, Prencipe, and Pavitt 2001, 613) . In essence, system integration becomes an important strategic mechanism in response to an increasingly complex organisation. Thus, in an organizational system consisting of a number of offshored components and entities in which value creation is largely located in the realms of the subsidiaries, the system integrator becomes the architect who integrates and coordinates the different value-creating components of the different actors into a final output. A fully systems-integrated organisation would therefore understand the interactions and dynamics of the entire organisation (Hobday, Davies, and Prencipe 2005) . Obviously, there are other ways of integrating an organisational system that comprises a globally dispersed and disaggregated supply chain. For instance, the surge of information technology has provided grounds for integrating and coordinating virtual organisations whose members and subunits are globally separate (Boudreau et al. 1998; Wiesenfeld, Raghuram, and Garud 1999) . Moreover, Ernst and Kim (2002) describe the prevalence of global production networks in which 'network flagships' (lead firms) integrate different activities through their higher network status.
In conclusion, MNCs such as Nokia need capabilities to respond to the new realities facing contemporary organizations. It is increasingly clear that traditional MNCs, because of increasing competition, lower costs of communication, and new competencies offered in new locations, can no longer withhold value-creating mandates within their headquarters locations. Therefore, our case study allows us to suggest that capabilities such as systems integration increasingly seem to be at the core of the successful management of disaggregated and geographically dispersed MNCs. The emergence of the harsh realities of offshoring (Aron and Singh 2005) and the unforeseen costs and difficulties of managing offshoring that undercut anticipated benefits (Larsen, Manning, and Pedersen 2013) may thus be related to firms' ability to control and appropriate the value created at other locations and outside the firms' boundaries. We hope that future research will continue to investigate the consequences of MNCs' changing geographical and organisational landscapes. We assume that the value added of activity c captured in each region is created by means of the factors of production. As is common in the economic literature, we consider three factors of production: physical capital stock (C), the size of the labour force (L) and knowledge capital stock (K). We assume that the impact of each production factor is identical to its elasticity of output. The previous empirical literature (including a number of studies) has estimated a Cobb-Douglas style of production function:
where A = multiplicative technology parameter Equation (A3) is typically estimated in logarithm form; thus, the parameters α, β and γ are the elasticity of output (Q) with respect to physical capital stock, labour and knowledge, respectively. In the majority of empirical studies, the estimated production function has included only two factors of production: physical capital and labour. Typically, the results of empirical studies show that the physical capital elasticity is approximately 0.4 and that the labour elasticity is approximately 0.6.
In studies in which knowledge capital is approximated by using R&D stock, the estimated knowledge capital elasticity varies typically between 0.05 and 0.25 (e.g. Hall 1993; Mairesse and Hall 1994; Capron and Cincera 1998; Harhoff 1998) . Based on these studies, our calculations assume that this elasticity is 0.15. However, most studies have not considered the double counting related to R&D. R&D investment also consists of investment in physical capital and labour, and these components are included in the regular production factors (see, e.g. Schankerman 1981; Mairesse and Hall 1996) . Based on earlier literature, we know that approximately 50% of the R&D expenditures are labour costs (Hall 2009 ). By taking this into account, we modify the capital elasticity (0.6) and labour elasticity (0.4) as follows.
Thus, our double-counting-corrected elasticities for capital, labour and R&D are 0.325, 0.525 and 0.15, respectively. We use these elasticities as the multipliers of production factors.
We continue by calculating the share of each production factor that is located in each region R and multiply each share by the elasticity of output. Next, we sum these values by region and obtain each region's share of value added (related to part c). Finally, we multiply this share by the value added of part c (Y c ). The value added of part c created in region R is calculated as follows:
where C R is the firm's physical capital stock in region R, C is the sum of the firm's physical capital in all regions, L R is the firm's employment in region R, L is the sum of the firm's employment in all regions, K R is the firm's knowledge capital in region R, and K is the sum of the firm's knowledge capital in all regions.
Thus, for instance, the domestically created value added is calculated as follows:
Equations (A4) and (A5) implicitly assume that total productivity is equal in each region. To account for regional productivity differences, we calculate the productivity corrected value added of part c that is created in region R as follows:
where MFP R is multi-factor productivity in region R. Thus, for instance, the domestically created value added is calculated as follows:
Operationalisation of production factors
If component-level factors and factor shares are unavailable, we use firm-level information on the location of different factors. Firm-level data are based on the annual reports and websites of each vendor. We have the following operationalised variables: C = Non-current assets or long-lived assets, depending on which one was reported in 2007. L = Number of employees (in 2007). K = R&D expenditure. We are unable to calculate R&D stock for each region; thus, we used R&D expenditure in 2007. In some cases, the reported regional breakdown of some factors is imperfect. In those cases, we read the entire annual report carefully and searched for necessary information on the Internet to approximate the regional breakdown. For instance, National Semiconductor (a US company) reports the regional breakdown of long-lived assets (annual report, p. 104) and employees (annual report, p. 12) but does not report the exact geographical breakdown of R&D expenditures. However, on p. 21, the company reports that their principal research facilities are located in Santa Clara (California, US) and that they also operate small design facilities in 13 different locations in the U.S. and 11 different locations outside the United States. Of those 11 overseas R&D units, approximately half are located in Asia, and half are in the EU-15 area. Based on these facts and the number of facilities per region, we estimate that approximately 70% of R&D is conducted in the U.S., and we divide the rest of the 30% fifty-fifty for Europe (15%) and Asia (15%). 
Operationalisation of multi-factor productivity (MFP)
We used value-added-based MFP figures of the electrical and optical equipment and postal and telecommunications industries reported by Inklaar and Timmer (2008) . These data are downloadable at www.ggdc.net/databases/levels.htm. Based on this database, the regional MFPs used in our estimations are as follows: MFP D = 1.24 (Finland); MFP E = 0.81 (the average of EU-15 countries, excluding Finland); MFP N = 1 (United States); MFP A = 0.52 (the average of Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan). The MFPs of China, South Korea and Taiwan are based on Motohashi (2007) , who uses Japan as a reference country (Japan = 1.00), and MFP O = 0.37 (the average of Australia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia).
Appendix 2. Robustness test 1
To test to what extent our results depend on our assumptions related to the value added created by material suppliers' vendors, we recalculate the geographical breakdown of value added by changing these assumptions. It might be argued that Asia's role in these upstream activities is more significant than we assumed in our basic calculations. Moreover, Australia, Russia and Africa are important raw material providers, and in this sense, our basic assumptions potentially underestimate the role of these regions. Because of these two reasons, we raise the share of Asia to 50% and that of Other countries (including, e.g. Australia, Russia and Africa) to 30% of the value added created by vendors of vendors, and we lower the share of EU-27 to 10% and that of North-America to 10%. Next, we re-calculate all potential combinations related to the final assembly location and the countries of final sale. 
